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Abstract: In this response to Sarbeswar Sahoo, 
and Eliza Kent, I attempt to address some of the 
questions, challenges and insights they have 
put forth in their comments on To Be Cared For. 
I focus, in particular, on the methodological 
question of how I define the object of that and 
what it leaves out, and how I justify my own 
epistemological stance in relation to those I 
study, whose views I sometimes challenge. I do 
so by highlighting a basic distinction between 
ethnographic studies which take religion itself 
as an object of investigation, and an 
anthropological study such as mine, in which 
religion is approached as an aspect of social 
reality. I then draw a distinction between two 
ways of understanding “culture,” and the links 
I see between them and the two contrasting 
views of religious conversion described in the 
book. I end by clarifying what I see as the 
ethical imperatives of this sort of research and 
its relation to the question of religious 
tolerance. 
 
I am very grateful to the Society for Hindu–
Christian Studies for the opportunity to 
converse with Sarbeswar Sahoo, Eliza Kent, 
Shana Sippy, and Amy Alloco at an SHCS-
sponsored panel for my book in Denver, 2018, 
and to respond further to the first two in print 
here. It is an honor, furthermore, to address 
the broader community of scholars who read 
and contribute to the Journal of Hindu–
Christian Studies. Their expertise is in precisely 
the two religious traditions whose differences, 
similarities, and interaction emerged as a 
major point of interest in my own research, 
though this was not what I originally set out to 
study. My questions were always sociological in 
focus and trained in particular on the crushing 
odds slum dwellers face and how they attempt 
to even them. This focus led me to religion and 
in particular to the religious lives of women, 
because religion was regarded as women’s 
work in the slum’s gendered division of labor. 
It is difficult to know how to address in a 
single essay all the questions and challenges 
my respondents have handed me and I have 
therefore adopted an oblique approach that 
begins with two features of To Be Cared For 
that many readers coming to it from a religious 
studies background have found noteworthy. 
The first concerns my observation that, in 
contrast to slum Christianity, the form of 
Hinduism I encountered in Kashtappattinam 
was discursively very thin—that tales of gods, 
great yogis and bhaktas, moral narratives, 
cosmological speculation, and so forth, were 
notably absent from Hinduism as practiced 
there (pp. 217–19). The other is my willingness, 
highlighted by Shana Sippy in Denver, to 
challenge and even “correct” the views of my 
informants. The first is noteworthy because the 
Hindu tradition overall is well known for its 
discursive richness, and because most if not all 
academic studies of Hinduism have focused, to 
greater or lesser degrees, on this aspect. The 
second, because it flies in the face of the 
common practice in the field of religious 
studies of treating informants’ testimony as 
veridical, and perhaps also because it flouts the 
stance of conceptual relativism that many 
scholars, including many anthropologists, see 
as ethically imperative in research contexts 
involving a clear power imbalance between the 
researcher and his or her subjects. 
My explanation for both comes down to 
the fact that although To Be Cared For has 
much to say about religion its ultimate focus is 
sociological. That is to say, its primary purpose 
is to understand the concrete relations among 
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persons and the objective structures—written 
and unwritten rules, the conventions, the 
distribution of wealth and power, and so on—
that shape them. These structures are 
objective insofar as they exceed participants’ 
conscious or unconscious ideas about them. 
Though social reality is mediated by 
participants’ beliefs about it, it is not reducible 
to those beliefs. Gaps between what people 
believe and what is in fact the case are 
inevitable, not only in the societies we study 
but also our own. Put another way, social 
reality is never transparent and necessarily 
exceeds our understanding of it (Graeber 
2015). The situation is very different when the 
object of study is not society but religion. At 
least in the case of lived religion (Orsi 2010), 
the contents of that religion are whatever 
participants take them to be—no more, and no 
less. There is no scope in the study of lived 
religion for the scholarly observer to second-
guess or “correct” what practitioners tell them, 
because the practitioner is the highest and 
ultimate authority when it comes to their own 
beliefs.1 
Some examples will help illustrate why I 
think it is important to actively challenge and 
not simply defer to native claims, at least when 
it comes to claims about social reality, and also 
why I do not extend this precept to matters of 
religious faith. One of the surprising discoveries 
of my research in the slums of 
Kashtappattinam was the very positive image 
the people living there had of foreigners, whom 
they envisioned as intrinsically moral and 
caring, in contrast to the majority of their 
fellow countrymen, who they believed to be 
uniquely immoral and selfish. That an 
oppressed population would harbor negative 
stereotypes of their oppressors is not 
surprising, but due diligence required me 
challenge their claim that Indians are uniquely 
or universally uncaring, because I do not 
believe it to be the case. But imagine a 
foreigner turning up in an African-American 
ghetto and trying to convince the people living 
there that white people aren’t really as racist as 
they imagine them to be. When I tried 
something similar in Anbu Nagar, the people I 
spoke to were politely dismissive. I simply had 
no standing to make such an argument, in their 
view, because I had not experienced the things 
they had. This may seem like a predictable 
outcome, but if I hadn’t challenged them, I 
would not have known this for a fact. And 
though I make very clear in the pages of To Be 
Cared For that I do not agree that caste people 
are uniformly uncaring, or uniquely so, by the 
end of my field research I had observed enough 
to understand why my subjects would think so. 
More perplexing to me was the firm 
conviction among slum dwellers that people 
outside India exemplify their own moral ideal 
of loving kindness, or care. This was both 
surprising, firstly, because it reversed the 
supposedly universal human trait of 
ethnocentrism. According to the theory of 
ethnocentrism, all humans see their own 
culture as the best, and envision a series of 
concentric circles of identity such that the 
more distant from the self/center the worse. 
The people of Anbu Nagar, by contrast, 
scrambled the conventional picture of ranked 
concentric identities. In their view, the most 
distant identity of all—those who share 
nothing with the people but their bare 
humanity—were regarded as natural allies, 
whereas those with whom they shared so 
much at cultural level, the majority of their 
fellow Tamils and fellow Indians, were not 
second best to themselves, but the worst 
people of all! The other reason this surprised 
me is that there was simply no basis for it. 
Foreigners do not, as anyone reading this will 
know, uphold the slum moral ideal of caring for 
the poor and the weak. 
As a foreigner myself, and someone who 
had spent the majority of my life outside India, 
in multiple countries, I had standing to speak 
authoritatively on this matter. Yet my attempts 
to convince them were consistently brushed 
off. I could not dislodge their view, but I would 
not have known this if I hadn’t tried! Only by 
challenging them did I learn that this particular 
belief was not only very deeply held, but deeply 
held despite the fact that they had no actual 
evidence for it. We often speak of beliefs—
religious or otherwise—as if they are all of a 
piece, but beliefs differ greatly in how they are 
held. Some beliefs are held deeply; others 
lightly. Beliefs can be based on the evidence of 
personal experience, but they can also 
contradict it. And how a particular belief is held 
is as important as its contents, at least for an 
ethnographer who wants to understand the 
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concrete social configuration within which 
those beliefs are produced. 
The point I am trying to make is that 
challenging the ideas of our research subjects 
plays an important methodological role, and I 
do not think it takes anything away from the 
people we write about to do so. Put another 
way, respecting our subjects’ dignity does not 
require us to treat them as infallible. Few 
people see themselves as infallible and, outside 
of a few very circumscribed domains of human 
activity, on most matters people are more 
interested in getting it right than insisting on 
the correctness of whatever their current 
understanding happens to be. The most 
significant exception is when holding a 
particular belief (or to be more precise, 
professing to hold it) functions as a marker of 
group identity, an affirmation of loyalty and 
belonging. For example, during the Vietnam 
War it was permissible in American public 
discourse to debate whether getting into the 
war had been a mistake or not, and also to 
criticize the particular way American strategic 
objectives were pursued. What was not up for 
discussion, as Noam Chomsky (1977) has 
argued, was the fundamental precept that 
America’s motives for being in the region were 
noble. To suggest that this might not be so—
that America was an amoral or even immoral 
force in the world—was to render oneself an 
outsider. In the language of the era, to voice 
such thoughts was simply un-American. 
It is generally only when a belief is linked to 
being part of a team that challenges to it are 
taken as an attack, and rightly so. For to 
undermine such a belief is to undermine the 
collective being of those who define 
themselves in terms of it. It threatens the very 
basis on which members are distinguished 
from non-members, and for this reason 
identity-defining beliefs are normally imbued 
with an intensely moral character. To reject 
such a belief is not merely to change one’s 
mind, but to betray, and group members often 
subject potential defectors to intense moral 
pressure to prevent them from doing so. 
Religious belief is widely regarded as a 
paradigmatic example of an identity-defining 
belief, or commitment. The history of 
Christianity provides a ready-made example, 
insofar as creedal statements have been 
explicitly used in that tradition to define group 
membership (Ruel 1982). But even traditions 
that do not require formal declarations of faith 
may react defensively when its beliefs are 
questioned, as for example when its gods are 
declared not to be gods at all but stone idols.2 
The opposition of many Hindus to religious 
conversion, and the strong moral pressure 
mobilized to prevent it, is certainly an example 
of belief playing such a role. Religious belief is, 
in this example, not merely about a person’s 
commitment to God, but simultaneously to a 
social identity. But what my research shows is 
that commitment to a particular god does not 
necessarily entail commitment to the social 
identity commonly associated with that god. 
Though the two commitments—which we 
might distinguish as faith and partisanship—
are often linked, they need not be, and a 
correct understanding of slum conversion is 
not possible if we fail to keep the two 
analytically distinct. 
Simply put, the question of which god a 
person worshipped in the slum was of no 
consequence to group identity. Faith, defined 
as a relationship of commitment between a 
human being and a god, did not entail 
commitment to any team or faction in the 
world of the slum, for the simple reason that 
“Christians” and “Hindus” did not comprise 
two distinct social formations or communities 
there. Even within a single household or family, 
one normally found both Christians and 
Hindus, and there was no expectation that 
children should follow the religious practices of 
their parents, or that spouses would worship 
the same gods as one another (pp. 152–3). 
There was therefore no attempt by slum 
dwellers to pressure one another to conform 
religiously. Slum dwellers argued frequently 
about which gods were the best. The criteria 
they assessed them on, however, were not 
moral but their propensity to respond to the 
needs of those who worshipped them, a topic 
on which new evidence was actively sought 
and hotly debted. In their morality, all gods 
were assumed to be identical. Hindu gods were 
not morally defective according to Christians, 
but existentially so—for unlike the Christian 
god they did not actually exist. Even Christian 
pastors did not present their god as morally 
distinct from Hindu gods, only more 
responsive, because Hindu gods were “mere 
stone idols” and therefore to help anyone, in 
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reality. Hindus, for their part, acknowledged 
the Christian god’s existence, but held him to 
be a weak and overly demanding deity (p. 152). 
Notably, neither side took offense at the 
other’s negative assessment of their chosen 
gods, misguided though they may be. A 
person’s decisions about which god or gods to 
worship—and therefore the phenomenon of 
religious conversion—was not a morally 
fraught in the slum, in short, because gods 
were regarded as morally identical. And they 
were regarded as morally identical, I argue, 
because they were not forced to double as 
emblems of social identity. 
Space does not permit me to elaborate on 
the relationship of faith that bound the 
individual worshipper to their god of choice, or 
how the notion of faith (vicuvācam) was 
articulated within a constellation of related 
concepts, such as belief (nampikai), knowledge 
(aṟivu), perception (terital), understanding 
(purital), and evidence (cāṭci) (Roberts 2012: 
283). Nor can I explain how such relationships 
might be voluntarily severed without moral 
jeopardy, though I will note that neither 
Christians nor Hindus believed worship was 
something gods themselves demanded or 
defined as obligatory for human beings. But I 
hope it is clear that the non-obligatory 
character of worship, like the non-moralization 
of religious choice itself, follows from the social 
organization of religious belief, i.e. decisions 
about which god to worship not being linked to 
social faction. This is a significant finding in the 
Indian context, where religious conversion is 
widely but falsely assumed to be socially 
disruptive, and legally suppressed on that basis 
(pp. 111–51). What I have shown, however, is 
that the disruptions and social conflict 
sometimes associated with religious 
conversion are an automatic outcome of 
religious conversion as such, or to the act of 
proselytism, or to religious differences as such, 
or to conversion being a psychologically 
destabilizing event—to cite just a few of the 
many arguments that circulate in India and 
elsewhere (pp. 111–115; Roberts 2012). They 
are due to power-infused relations among 
people, in which gods function as emblems of 
communal identity, and in which the dominant 
community is permitted to assert its will over 
minorities under the guise of “wounded 
sentiments” (pp. 261–2; Viswanath 2016). 
I began this response by stressing that, 
although religion plays a prominent role in To 
Be Cared For, its ultimate focus is sociological, 
and that understanding slum religion assumed 
significance because of the role it plays in my 
subjects’ socially constituted existence. I 
promised that the sociological character of my 
study would help explain two features that 
readers approaching To Be Cared For from the 
perspective of Religious Studies have found 
unusual: my willingness to challenge my 
informant’s beliefs, and my finding that 
Hinduism as practiced was discursively very 
thin. The thinness of local Hinduism, as I have 
described it, comes as a surprise to many 
because the Hindu tradition as a whole is 
renowned for its discursive richness, a richness 
that has attracted the attention of scholars for 
obvious reasons and is therefore heavily 
represented in the literature. And indeed, had 
my own research mandate been to contribute 
to the study of Hinduism as such, rather than 
being confined to the aspects of it that were 
relevant to the women I had chosen to study, I 
would have had much more to say.   
In a slum tenement not far from Anbu 
Nagar lived a nonagenarian by the name of 
Loganathan, a kind-eyed man whose slight but 
ever-present smile reminded me of the Zen 
teacher Thich Nhat Hanh. He was known locally 
as a medium (cāmiyāṭi) (p. 218), and for his 
talent for inducing women to become 
possessed in certain festivals (p. 180, fig 10). 
Apart from these ritual functions, however, 
Loganathan played no discernable role in slum 
women’s lives, and no one I asked seemed to 
know anything about him or care. But based on 
the handful of interviews I conducted with him, 
I can attest that he was a wellspring of 
cosmological knowledge, who claimed, 
furthermore, to know “hundreds and 
hundreds” of songs about the gods, and 
thousands of praises. He had learned from his 
own father, also a cāmiyāṭi. Loganathan shared 
his sadness that, though he had so much to 
teach, no one was interested. He had not a 
single student, and knew that when he died all 
the knowledge he had accumulated would die 
with him.  
He was also keenly interested in 
Christianity—which he understood not as a 
rival sect but a powerful ritual system with 
unique capacities that complemented his own. 
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One of the most useful things about 
Christianity, he told me, was the startling fact 
that when the dead are buried with Christian 
rites their spirits go away forever and never 
return as ghosts to haunt the living. How did he 
know this, I asked him, and was he sure? He 
assured me that he knew all the local ghosts, 
and had spoken with most of them, and not a 
single one of them had been buried as a 
Christian. He did not know how this had been 
accomplished, but he hailed it as among the 
most important benefits conferred on the slum 
by local pastors, whom he seemed to regard as 
professional colleagues. He was aware that 
they did not return the favor, though he did not 
begrudge their ignorance. In this and so many 
other ways, Loganathan’s religious ideas were 
consistent with what I have described as the 
logic of slum religion (pp. 152–84)—the 
underlying principles and assumption about 
what constitutes religion as such, for both 
Christians and Hindus alike.  
Loganathan was already an elderly man in 
2003–4, and he is almost certainly no more. 
The last of his lineage, his knowledge will die 
with him, though I am certain there are others 
like him, somewhere, just waiting for some 
young scholar to take an interest in what they 
have to teach. I wish I had been able to delve 
deeper into his world than I did, but because 
the focus of my research was sociological, he 
appears only fleetingly in the story I tell (pp. 
180, 218). His treasure trove of knowledge 
played no role at all, because the women on 
whom my study centers were indifferent to it. 
But the fact that he existed at all and was 
ignored despite possessing such a wealth of 
knowledge, supports one major claim in my 
book. Namely, that it is not the discursive 
richness of Christianity that distinguishes it 
from Hinduism, ultimately, but its novel 
institutional form.  
The key innovation of slum Christianity was 
that it had, quite unintentionally I suspect, 
provided slum women with a public platform of 
a kind they had never previously possessed 
from which to articulate claims against 
husbands and others who had failed to care for 
them. The duty to care was attested equally by 
Hindus and Christians, who alike hailed it as the 
very essence of human morality, not linked to 
any religion in particular, but sacred 
nonetheless. Christianity provided women with 
a new language though which speak about 
care, but they understood it to be a universal 
human value, not a specifically Christian one. 
Slum women, in other words, did not need 
Christianity to teach them about care. What 
they lacked was not the words but the 
institutional means to make their grievances a 
matter of public knowledge and therefore 
collective responsibility. The relationship 
between husband and wife constituted a 
dangerous moral fault line (p. 81) within the 
slum community—one of two I detail in the 
book—in which the duty to care was honored 
as often as not in the breach. The mistreatment 
of women continued, however, because the 
sacred moral precept it violated remained a 
phantasm so long as women lacked the 
institutional means to call for help. 
There is a lesson here, I am sure. 
 
Notes 
1  I stress that the principle of native 
authority applies only to the study of lived 
religion, by which I mean religion as it is 
experience and understood in the lives of 
practitioners. The principle does not hold for 
religion as expressed in a textual corpus 
stretching over many centuries or millennia. 
Conceptualized this way, religion is an 
objective reality that, like society, is not 
reducible to participants’ ideas about it. A 
second qualification concerns the distinction 
between beliefs and practices. In contrast to 
Robert Orsi and other scholars of lived 
religion, I hold that the principle of native 
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not practices. For in contrast to beliefs, 
practices are only partially defined by 
participants’ ideas about them, a point pithily 
expressed by Michel Foucault’s observation 
that “people know what they do; they 
frequently know why they do what they do; 
but what they don’t [necessarily] know is 
what what they do does” (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982: 187). 
2 Hinduism famously emphasizes correct 
practice (orthopraxy) over correct belief 
(orthodoxy), and in this way differs from 
creedal traditions like Christianity and Islam. 
But the absence of a single orthodoxy in the 
Hindu tradition does not imply and absence 
of belief of the kind anthropologists are 
concerned with, which includes the full range 
of implicit codes and assumptions through 
which human beings comprehend their 
world. In this sense belief does not stand in 
contrast to religious practice but is intrinsic 
to it. Religious practices necessarily entail 
beliefs of some sort, even if unformulated, for 
example the belief that a particular ritual 
ought to be performed or that some benefit 
(spiritual or otherwise) will come of it. 
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